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R&D Spillovers and Welfare Effect of Privatization with an R&D Subsidy 
Sang-Ho Lee and Timur K. Muminov** 
Abstract 
We reexamine the results in Gil Molto et al. (2011) and compare the welfare effect of privatization policy 
in an R&D competition between a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly with an R&D subsidy. We show 
that an R&D subsidy with privatization policy is beneficial for society unless the spillovers rate is 
sufficiently low. Otherwise, public R&D leadership in a mixed market is socially superior. 
JEL Classifications: L13; L32; H21 
Keywords: Privatization; R&D subsidy; R&D spillovers; R&D leadership;  
1. Introduction 
Privatization and liberalization policies prompted policymakers to reconstruct their actions with 
respect to encouraging competition, enhancing innovations and stimulating R&D performances. A 
significant number of studies have concluded that R&D spillovers are critical to assess the welfare effect 
of governmental intervention.1  Due to its important features associated with policy implications on 
innovation and competition activities, the works on the relations between privatization and R&D policies 
have become popular. 
Recent studies have suggested that the conventional presumption about the desirability and 
efficiency of privatization can be overturned when the R&D spillovers are included. For instance, Gil 
Molto et al. (2011) examined the welfare effect of privatization policy in a mixed and a private duopoly 
market with or without the use of subsidies to R&D, and showed that privatization of the public firm 
reduces R&D activities and welfare irrespective of R&D spillovers. Further, Gil Molto (2018) extended 
                                                          

 Sang-Ho Lee: Department of Economics, Chonnam National University, 77 Yongbong-ro, Bukgu, Gwangju 61186 
South Korea. E-mail: sangho@chonnam.ac.kr 

 Timur Muminov: Department of Economics, Chonnam National University, 77 Yongbong-ro, Bukgu, Gwangju 
61186 South Korea. E-mail: smtk0171@gmail.com 




to the oligopolistic competition market and showed that privatization of the public firm can reduce the 
welfare when the number of competing private firms is not sufficiently large.2 
However, these analyses compared an asymmetric regulatory environment wherein the government 
is able to use the combination of two polices between direct ownership control over the public firm and 
an indirect R&D subsidy in a mixed market, while only an indirect R&D subsidy is available in a private 
market. Therefore, if the government can provide an R&D subsidy in a mixed duopoly as well, it is highly 
likely to improve the welfare under full ownership over the public firm. Then, a sequential question is 
that if the government is only able to use one of two policy options because of political reasons3, when 
should the government privatize the public firm? 
This study considers alternative policy situation that allows us to anticipate whether the public firm 
is likely to be privatized in the situation where only a single policy option is available. In specific, we 
reexamine the equilibrium of firm’s R&D competition in Gil Molto et al. (2011) with different scenarios 
and investigate the welfare effect of privatization policy between a mixed duopoly without an R&D 
subsidy and a private duopoly with an R&D subsidy. In the presence of R&D spillovers, we also allow 
public R&D leadership game in a mixed duopoly market and show that public firm can increase welfare 
with lower rate of spillovers while higher rate of spillovers induces the government to privatize the public 
firm and subsidize the R&D investments. Our findings highlight the significance of R&D spillovers with 
respect to liberalization and innovation policies under different structure of organizations.4 
2. The Model 
Our model follows Gil-Molto et al. (2011) with a simple duopoly market setting consisting of two firms, 
firms 0 (either private or public firm) and 1 (private firm), which produce homogeneous goods. Let the 
                                                          
2
 As extensive works, Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) examined the relative welfare effects of an R&D and an output 
subsidy in a mixed duopoly while Lee et al. (2017) considered partial privatization and showed that government has 
a higher incentive to privatize the public firm under the output subsidy than the R&D subsidy. Further, Zikos (2007) 
and Lee and Tomaru (2017) investigated the policy mix of R&D and output subsidies in a mixed oligopoly, and 
found that the privatization policy does not influence welfare consequences although R&D stage is introduced 
3
 For example, if the government undergoes public deficit and budget with state-owned enterprises, it might have 
an option to sell them and then publicly finance the privatized firms with increased subsidies or reduced taxes.  
4
 The EU R&D policies have promoted different forms of research joint ventures and joint research agreements for 
encouraging higher returns from appropriative R&D performances under the proactive program of the research 
Framework Programmes (FPs) in 1984 and the Research, Innovation, and Science Policy Experts (RISE) in 2014.  
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inverse demand function be 𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑄, where 𝑃 is the market price, 𝑄 = 𝑞0 + 𝑞1 is the market output, 
and 𝑞𝑖 is the output of firm i = 0,1, respectively.  
We assume that firms face identical costs functions and marginal costs are increasing. Moreover, 
firms invest in cost-reducing R&D with spillovers, i.e., as well as its own R&D, a firm can benefit from 
its competitor’s R&D via spillovers of 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]. In specific, firm i’s  cost function is given by: 𝐶(𝑞𝑖, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽𝑥𝑗)𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑖2   and   𝛤(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖2,     𝑖, 𝑗 = 0,1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.                      (1) 
where 𝑎 > 𝑐 > 0 and 𝑥𝑖 denotes the amount of R&D investment for firm i, which exhibits decreasing 
returns to scale, i.e., the firm has to spend 𝑥𝑖2 to implement cost-reducing R&D, 𝑥𝑖. We also consider that 
each firm might receive an R&D subsidy, 𝑠𝑥𝑖, where 𝑠 denotes the per-unit subsidy rate of R&D output.  
Then, the profit function of the firm is: 𝜋𝑖 = (𝑎 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞𝑗)𝑞𝑖 − (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽𝑥𝑗)𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖2 − 𝑥𝑖2 + 𝑠 𝑥𝑖 ,     𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑖, 𝑗 = 0,1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.        (2) 
The private firm maximizes profit, while the public firm maximizes social welfare defined as the sum of 
consumer surplus, 𝐶𝑆 = 𝑄2/2, and both firms’ profits minus total expenditures of R&D subsidies, if exist: 𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 − 𝑠(𝑥0 + 𝑥1).                                                                                                          (3) 
Note that the subsidies are financed from taxpayers in a lump sum manner, so that they cancel out when 
aggregating. We assume that the government determines the subsidy rate to maximize the social welfare. 
We compare two distinct models of private and mixed duopolies in which firm 0 is either a private 
firm or a public firm while firm 1 is a private firm in both cases. We assume that an R&D subsidy is only 
provided in a private market and both firms play Cournot competition in R&D and output stages.  
The timing in the model is as follows. In stage one, the government commits to the level of an 
R&D subsidy if it is a private market while its level is zero if it is a mixed market.5  In stage two, firms 
choose their R&D investments simultaneously. In stage three, firms compete in the product market by 
setting quantities simultaneously. The game is solved by backward induction to obtain its subgame perfect 
equilibrium. 
                                                          
5 This asymmetry allows us to anticipate whether the public firm is likely to be privatized in this game. Then, if the 
government can provide an R&D subsidy in a mixed duopoly, as shown in Gil Molto (2011), it can always improve 
the welfare under the two regulatory instruments with full ownership of the public firm and an R&D subsidy. 
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3. The Analysis and comparison 
We first consider a private duopoly with an R&D subsidy. The equilibrium outcomes come from Gil 
Molto et al. (2011) in Table 4. In specific, we have the following results: 
Lemma 1. In a private duopoly with an R&D subsidy, the equilibrium outcomes are: 
(i) R&D subsidy rate: 𝑠𝑃 = 2(𝑎−𝑐)(1+11𝛽)66−9𝛽(2+𝛽)  ,  
(ii) R&D investments: 𝑥𝑖𝑃 = 3(𝑎−𝑐)(1+𝛽)22−3𝛽(2+𝛽) ,   𝑖 = 0,1. 
(iii) Output levels: 𝑞𝑖𝑃 = 5(𝑎−𝑐)22−3𝛽(2+𝛽) ,   𝑖 = 0,1.  
(iv) The profit of the private firm: 𝜋𝑖𝑃 = (𝑎−𝑐)2(43+𝛽(6+13𝛽))(22−3𝛽(2+𝛽))2 ,   𝑖 = 0,1.    
(v) Social welfare: 𝑊𝑃 = 6(𝑎−𝑐)222−3𝛽(2+𝛽).   
where superscript P denotes the R&D subsidy in a Private duopoly. Note that not only the R&D subsidy 
rate but the R&D investments and outputs are increasing in the spillovers. 
We also consider a mixed duopoly without an R&D subsidy. The equilibrium outcomes come from Gil-
Molto et al. (2011) in Table 1. In specific, we have the following results: 
Lemma 2. In a mixed duopoly without an R&D subsidy, the equilibrium outcomes are: 
(i) R&D investments: 𝑥0𝑀 = (𝑎−𝑐)(25+2𝛽(18−8𝛽))167+2𝛽(1−𝛽)(25−𝛽) , 𝑥1𝑀 = 2(𝑎−𝑐)(9−𝛽2))167+2𝛽(1−𝛽)(25−𝛽) 
(ii) Output levels: 𝑞0𝑀 = (𝑎−𝑐)(53−𝛽(31−18𝛽))167+2𝛽(1−𝛽)(25−𝛽) , 𝑞1𝑀 = 11(𝑎−𝑐)(3+𝛽)167+2𝛽(1−𝛽)(25−𝛽) 
(iii) The profit of the private firm: 𝜋1𝑀 = 2(𝑎−𝑐)2(3+𝛽)2(103+2(6−𝛽)𝛽)(167+2(25−𝛽)(1−𝛽)𝛽)2   
(iv) Social welfare: 𝑊𝑀 = (𝑎−𝑐)2(7736+𝛽(6550−𝛽(2495+2𝛽(864−239𝛽))))(167+2(25−𝛽)(1−𝛽)𝛽)2   
where superscript M denotes the R&D subsidy in a Mixed duopoly. Note that 𝑥0𝑀 > 𝑥1𝑀 and 𝑞0𝑀 > 𝑞1𝑀. 
Thus, the public firm takes more R&D investments and produce more outputs. Note also that public firm's 
R&D and both firms' outputs are increasing in the spillovers rate while that of private firm is only 
increasing for a high rate of spillovers, i.e,. 𝜕𝑥1𝑀𝜕𝛽 >< 0 if 𝛽 >< 0.879. 
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Then, we compare the two scenarios: 
Lemma 3. Comparing the equilibrium outcomes between private and mixed markets,  
(i) 𝑥0𝑃 >< 𝑥0𝑀 if 𝛽 >< 0.384 while 𝑥1𝑃 > 𝑥1𝑀 and 𝑋𝑃 > 𝑋𝑀 for any 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] 
(ii)      𝑞0𝑃 < 𝑞0𝑀 and 𝑞1𝑃 > 𝑞1𝑀 for any 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] while 𝑄𝑃 >< 𝑄𝑀 if 𝛽 <> 0.647 
(iii)      𝜋1𝑃 > 𝜋1𝑀 for any 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]  
Lemma 3 (i) provides the effect of R&D subsidy policy along with privatization on the equilibrium 
outcomes. It states that with privatization policy, the private firm’s R&D increases while that of the public 
firm depends on the spillovers rate. In particular, the privatized (public) firm increases R&D only when 
the spillovers rate is high. That is, the incentive effect of an R&D subsidy works for a higher spillovers. 
However, total industry R&D investments increase after privatization.  
Lemma 3(ii) indicates privatization effect that the privatized firm becomes a profit-oriented firm and 
behaves less aggressively by reducing its output. As the outputs are strategic substitutes, it increases the 
output of the competitive private firm irrespective the rate of spillover. That is, output substitution effect 
occurs. However, total industry output increases after privatization only when the spillovers rate is low. 
It also implies that consumer surplus increases when the government implements R&D subsidy policy 
with privatization policy for a lower spillovers rate. 
Finally, Lemma 3(iii) states that privatization policy increases the profit of the private firm for any rate 
of spillover. Due to the output substitution effect between the two firms, the private firm can increase its 
output and profits as well. 
Proposition 1. Comparing the welfare levels, 𝑊𝑃 >< 𝑊𝑀 if 𝛽 >< 0.26405. 
In their findings in Proposition 6 and 9, respectively, Gil Molto et al. (2011) showed that privatization 
would result in a reduction in total surplus with or without subsidization. This is sharply contrast to our 
findings in Proposition 1. We show that social welfare in a private duopoly with an R&D subsidy can be 
higher than that in a mixed duopoly without subsidization unless the spillovers rate is sufficiently low. 
Therefore, the rate of spillovers is crucial to determine the welfare effect of privatization policy.   
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4. Public R&D leadership and policy discussion 
In this section, we consider a sequential-move game in R&D choices under public firm’s leadership in a 
mixed market, while keeping that both firms play Cournot competition in output stage.6 This structural 
enhancement of the model allows us to anticipate whether the public firm is likely to play either a leader 
or a follower in making its R&D decision. Then, the public firm chooses its R&D first and then by 
observing this, the private firm acts as a follower in R&D choices. In the last stage, both firms compete 
with outputs simultaneously. We can solve the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game and then show 
that our findings in Proposition 1 is still robust in the public R&D leadership game in a mixed market. 
Lemma 4. In a mixed duopoly with a public R&D leadership game, the equilibrium outcomes are: 
(i) R&D investments: 𝑥0𝐿𝑀 = (𝑎−𝑐)(2551+3890𝛽+764𝛽2−122𝛽3−84𝛽4+12𝛽5)17189+7440𝛽−5922𝛽2−236𝛽3−4𝛽4+72𝛽5−12𝛽6 
  𝑥1𝐿𝑀 = 2(𝑎−𝑐)(927+126𝛽−205𝛽2+92𝛽3−42𝛽4+6𝛽5)17189+7440𝛽−5922𝛽2−236𝛽3−4𝛽4+72𝛽5−12𝛽6. 
(ii) Output levels: 𝑞0𝐿𝑀 = (𝑎−𝑐)(5447+3863𝛽−1562𝛽2−344𝛽3+54𝛽4)17189+7440𝛽−5922𝛽2−236𝛽3−4𝛽4+72𝛽5−12𝛽6 
 𝑞1𝐿𝑀 = 11(𝑎−𝑐)(309+145𝛽−20𝛽2+24𝛽3−6𝛽4)17189+7440𝛽−5922𝛽2−236𝛽3−4𝛽4+72𝛽5−12𝛽6 
(iii) The profit of the private firm: 𝜋1𝐿𝑀 = 2(𝑎−𝑐)2(103+12𝛽−2𝛽2)(309+145𝛽−20𝛽2+24𝛽3−6𝛽4)2(17189+7440𝛽−5922𝛽2−236𝛽3−4𝛽4+72𝛽5−12𝛽6)2   
(iv) Social welfare: 𝑊𝐿𝑀 = (𝑎−𝑐)2(4768+3246𝛽−835𝛽2−192𝛽3+24𝛽4)17189+7440𝛽−5922𝛽2−236𝛽3−4𝛽4+72𝛽5−12𝛽6  
where the superscript LM denotes the equilibrium with a public Leadership in a Mixed market. Note that 𝑥0𝐿𝑀 > 𝑥1𝐿𝑀 and 𝑞0𝐿𝑀 > 𝑞1𝐿𝑀.  Note also that public firm's R&D and both firms' outputs are increasing in 
the spillovers rate while that of private firm is only increasing for a high rate of spillovers, i.e., 𝜕𝑥1𝐿𝑀𝜕𝛽 >< 0 if 𝛽 >< 0.759, but its threshold is lower than Cournot R&D competition in a mixed duopoly. Thus, public 
leadership can encourage the private firm’s R&D for a higher rate of spillovers. 
Lemma 5. Comparing equilibrium outcomes between private market and the public R&D leadership in 
a mixed market: 
                                                          
6 Regarding the sequencing R&D decisions with Cournot competition in outputs, see Amir et al. (2000) in a private 
duopoly and Leal et al. (2020) in a mixed duopoly with corporate social responsibility. 
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(i) 𝑥0𝑃 >< 𝑥0𝐿𝑀 if 𝛽 >< 0.401 while  𝑥1𝑃 > 𝑥1𝐿𝑀 and 𝑋𝑃 > 𝑋𝐿𝑀 for any 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] 
(ii) 𝑞0𝑃 < 𝑞0𝐿𝑀 and 𝑞1𝑃 > 𝑞1𝐿𝑀 for any 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] while 𝑄𝑃 >< 𝑄𝐿𝑀 if 𝛽 <> 0.665 
(iii) 𝜋1𝑃 > 𝜋1𝐿𝑀 for any 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] 
Lemma 5 provides the similar effect of R&D subsidy policy along with privatization on the equilibrium 
outcomes derived under Cournot R&D competition in Lemma 3. Only difference is that the threshold 
value for increasing the effect of privatization is higher. That is, (i) the incentive effect of an R&D subsidy 
after privatization works for more higher spillovers, while (ii) total industry output increases after 
privatization for less lower spillovers. Finally, (iii) due to the output substitution effect between the two 
firms, the private firm can increase its output and profits as well. 
Proposition 2. Comparing the welfare levels, 𝑊𝑃 >< 𝑊𝐿𝑀 if 𝛽 >< 0.26407. 
Proposition 2 supports that social welfare in a private duopoly with an R&D subsidy can be higher 
than that in a mixed duopoly without subsidization unless the spillovers rate is sufficiently low. Note that 
the welfare under the public R&D leadership is always higher than that under the Cournot R&D 
competition in a mixed duopoly, i.e., 𝑊𝑀 < 𝑊𝐿𝑀  for any 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] . Our findings suggest that 
nationalization is effective for increasing welfare as long as the spillovers rate is relatively low, while 
privatization is effective for maintaining higher welfare under the R&D subsidy subject to higher spillover 
rate. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This study investigated  whether the public firm is likely to be privatized and showed that the rate of 
spillovers play a key role to determine the welfare effect of privatization policy. We found that that social 
welfare in a private duopoly with an R&D subsidy can be higher than that in a mixed duopoly without 
subsidization unless the spillovers rate is sufficiently low. We also examined the public R&D leadership 
game in a mixed duopoly and confirmed that our findings are robust. Therefore, in the absence of an 
R&D subsidy, full ownership of public firm can increase welfare only with lower rate of spillovers, while 
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